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Available online xxxxAutomated vehicles (AVs) have the potential to cause profound shifts across a wide range of areas of human life, in-
cluding economic structures, land use, lifestyles and personal well-being. Most current social science on AVs is
narrowly framed. Research on public attitudes has focused on whether people are likely to accept and use AVs. We
contend that failing to anticipate a wider range of profound social implications may have serious negative
consequences, and that social scientists from a range of disciplinary perspectives can provide invaluable insights.
Our conclusions are the product of a workshop in London held in 2018 to discuss the place of social science research
in relation to the development of AVs. This paper summarises a core selection of our concerns, interests, theoretical
and substantive points of reference and aspirations for a constructive role in this field of research and development.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Research agenda1. Introduction and background
This article is jointly authored by a group of social scientists. It is the
product of a workshop held in London in April 2018 to discuss the role of
social sciences in the development of automated vehicles (AVs). The au-
thors are mostly based in the UK, and come from a range of disciplines:
transport studies, science and technology studies, sociology, social psychol-
ogy, planning, anthropology, geography, politics, and social policy. The
workshop involved conversations between ourselves as well as with a selec-
tion of actors involved in the development of AVs, including governmentC1E 6BT, UK.
er Ltd. This is an open access articresearchers, policy makers, analysts, academic and commercial engineers
and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The views stated in this
paper are, however, our own.
The development of AVs brings potentially fundamental changes to
daily life, and the degree and acceleration of investment in it by govern-
ments and private companies signals the extent of anticipation in their de-
velopment. One estimate suggested that by 2017more than $80 billion had
already been invested (Kerry and Karsten, 2017). A more up-to-date survey
would surely indicate a much larger number. Companies and national gov-
ernments claim to be in a ‘race’ to develop driverless technologies and cap-
ture their economic benefits (Welch and Behrmann, 2018). AVs are often
presented as inevitable. Debates about them are pushed by claims about
the possibilities of new technologies, with substantial focus on a promisedle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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in largely technological terms obscures both our understanding of the social
and political complexities that might accompany any technological bene-
fits, and the consideration of alternative mobility trajectories. The indeter-
minacies and uncertainties of innovation may mean that the technology
ends up taking a very different shape from the narrow range of possible fu-
tures currently being imagined, and it would be foolhardy if not actively
dangerous to neglect this broader view.
Alongside the growth of investment and political interest in AVs we have
seen rapid growth in research publications. Gandia et al. record an average
annual growth rate in publication numbers of 39% (2019, p. 15), confirming
earlierfindings by Cavoli et al. (2017). But the social has received less attention
than the technological. Moreover, the significance of the social, and the role of
social science, has been limited, as is so often the case with the development of
new technologies and their surrounding scholarship. Social science andhuman-
ities research is often restricted to work on ‘implications’. With genetics, for ex-
ample, social scientists, philosophers and lawyers were asked to get involved in
what came to be labelled ‘ELSI-fication’, researching the downstream ‘ethical,
legal and social implications’ of new technological possibilities (Guston, 2004;
Stirling, 2005). Sometimes the role of social sciences has been framed in even
more instrumental terms, with its job being to understand public anxieties
with the aim of smoothing the uptake of a predetermined technology – social
scientists have oftenbeen castmerely as “experts in the study of public opinion”
(Macnaghten et al. 2005, p. 271). While social scientists can provide much-
needed rigour and clarity in doing this, their role in the emergence of AVs
can and should be deeper and broader.
We are not alone in this line of thinking. Bissell et al. (2020) argue that crit-
ical sociology can and should play a constructive role in public debates about
the development ofAVs.Weaim topush this argument further, and to persuade
the reader that a larger spectrum of social sciences should also contribute ac-
tively to the development and governance of AVs. Our agenda is a critical
one, challenging what we see as the dominant story, but it is also constructive.
Our hope is that, through challenge, we can contribute to more robust patterns
of innovation that, by engagingwith social dimensions, are better able to realise
opportunities for fair, safe, efficient mobility than if innovation was left to the
relatively narrow set of interests currently leading the process. As well as pro-
viding social evidence and insight, social science can serve a purpose in under-
standing and integrating different perspectives. However, how to do so is not a
trivial question. The answer is not just ‘more social science’.
In our view, constructive social science means moving beyond the con-
ventional and restrictive division of labour between the development of tech-
nology on one hand and assessment of it on the other. Practically speaking,
this should entail new modes of collaboration with those involved in the de-
velopment of the technologies. For example, an underappreciated benefit of
the social sciences is in generating concepts that can, when built into use sce-
narios, help technologists and systemarchitects increase the resilience and ro-
bustness of their thinking and planning. Models exist for this in other areas of
technology development and implementation. For example, the regulation of
water usage (Floress et al., 2015) has benefitted from such an involvement of
social scientists. In a similar way, rather than only playing a role downstream
in the assessment of impacts, implications and unintended consequences, we
seek to make a contribution upstream, in the design and governance of
sociotechnical systems and the transitions towards them.
The social sciences can offer tools for integrating perspectives at both
philosophical and practical levels. We follow Flyvbjerg (2011) in advocat-
ing a mode of social science based on phronesis (practical wisdom) as well
as episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne (craft knowledge). We see
the role of social science not just in contributing to the knowledge base,
but also in reframing questions and highlighting uncertainties and contin-
gencies, with a view towards more “tentative” modes of governance,11 As Kuhlmann et al. put it, “tentative” governance is contrasted with “definitive” gover-
nance and reflects the inherent uncertainties in emerging science and technology. “Gover-
nance is ‘tentative’ when public and private interventions are designed as a dynamic process
that is prudent and preliminary rather than assertive and persistent” (Kuhlmann et al., 2019,
p. 1091).
2putting technology ‘in its place’ in terms of both understanding and respect-
ing the contexts in which it might be deployed.
We think that there is appetite for this mode ofworking, andwe detect a
willingness among stakeholders in AV development to understand the so-
cial dimensions of AV technologies. The more thoughtful innovators
know that the technology, if it is to succeed in its own terms, must work
with and incorporate the social complexities of the real world. From our
own side, we appreciate and need to learn more about the perspectives of
those other actors.We are acutely aware of the competitive drive to develop
a technology that promises substantial economic and social benefits. And
we know that any number of interests can shape the creation of new tech-
nological possibilities.We know that complex technological systems are de-
fined as much by how they are diffused and used as by how they are
developed in the laboratory. Many of us have been involved in the nascent
debate on AVs, often in collaboration with engineers and/or policymakers.
Some of us come with experience of previous transport debates or previous
emerging technologies, from which policymakers and innovators have
learnt sometimes hard lessons.
2. Themes
In the remainder of this article we offer a discussion of potential social
science contributions with a view to developing a critical, constructive re-
search agenda. We organise this thematically (rather than by academic dis-
cipline), as follows:
1. Single versus multiple futures
2. The public(s)
3. Distributional impacts
4. Safety
5. Physical infrastructure
6. Data
7. Environment
8. Governance and power
We do not claim to offer an exhaustive account of social-science think-
ing here; our text reflects the backgrounds of the particular academics
who participated in the workshop and who have contributed to this
paper. In particular, the majority of us are UK based and most, though not
all, of our research on AVs is centred on high-income countries. In addition,
the bulk of our discussion centres on AVs for personal transport; we make
some references to the possible role of automation in transporting freight,
but do not consider other areas of AV use. This paper is offered as a spring-
board rather than as a prescription, andwe encourage other social scientists
to add to and develop the thinking that we offer here.
In the sections that followwe aim to outline briefly relevant background
in terms of AV development as well as in terms of social-science perspec-
tives: frameworks that have been used, their strengths and limitations
and, where relevant, suggestions for others that may be enlightening. We
draw attention to particular areas of focus that we think are important,
and offer ideas for potential contributions from the social sciences: issues
to be researched, advocated for, actions to be taken. The value that social
sciences can bring ranges from a broadening of understandings of a topic,
enabling important nuances or complexities to be appreciated, to active in-
volvement from the earliest point in the development of both the technol-
ogy itself and its regulation.
2.1. Single versus multiple futures
One of the most important realisations for an overview of our subject
matter is its inherent plurality. When possible AV futures are described in
public, they may have various forms, even if each individual vision is pre-
sented with certainty, as a prediction. AVs may be imagined, for example,
as an individually-owned car with someone in the driving seat who just
happens not to be driving; they may be seen as part of robotaxi fleets that
are integrated intoMobility as a Service (MaaS) systems; theymay look rad-
ically different from conventional cars, with their own road infrastructure.
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lead to very different public discussions, but these differences are often
unacknowledged.
The dramatic changes implied by some AV futures are also often
played down or not acknowledged. Much of the coverage to date on
AVs suggests that the technology – in whatever form –will simply arrive
on our roads, that people will start benefiting from it and that little else
will change. This narrative is convenient for innovators but misleading,
because it skirts around the profound questions about what such a po-
tentially disruptive technology might mean. People and environments
are shaped in response to technologies and, in turn, shape them. The
narrative is also misleading because it encourages us to trust that all
will be well and to postpone scrutiny of the purposes and consequences
of the technology. Understanding the possibilities of AVs means under-
standing the inter-relationships between people, vehicles and environ-
ments, and the consequences of those relationships. Sometimes those
relationships are conflictual or oppressive, and (looking forward to the
themes of distributional impacts and power) a key role of social scien-
tists is to scrutinise and challenge those dynamics.
The meanings involved in automation are as much about the new iden-
tities and subjectivities related to it as the hardware and software that
drives it. As such, the field for social-science research is multifarious, and
another part of our challenge is tomap the terrain – for example, identifying
what is meant by ‘people’, and howmany differentmeanings are entailed in
this term. Some AV developers may simply focus their attention on poten-
tial purchasers of private AVs, but consumption of AVs would likely entail
a substantial impact on others who are forced to share the road with AVs,
whether as other drivers, cyclists or pedestrians. The notion of a smooth
transition to an AV world should not be taken for granted.
In this space of multiple possible trajectories, social scientists are not
unique in their capacity to foresee the many possible ‘AV worlds’ but, given
the many conceptual frameworks in our repertoire for making sense of com-
plex social contexts, we can offer organising principles of thought to keep the
possibility space tractable. The themes, concepts and disciplinary frameworks
outlined in the next sections can contribute to this architecture.
2.2. The public(s)
Perhaps the most obvious role for social science in the development of
any emerging technology, and the one in which technology developers
are most likely to cast social scientists, is in understanding public opinion
or attitudes. Research into users' reactions to and interactions with AVs is
a central part of AVdevelopment; it falls under the heading of human factors
research, typically carried out by psychologists within engineering research
programmes. Developers of AVs need to know, for example, how users
would behave and adapt to their new role when an AV takes control from
or needs to hand back control to a driver.
These micro-level questions of human-machine interaction (HMI) have
broader corollaries, arising from the profound changes to the constitution
of the road that AVs suggest: how would humans (drivers, pedestrians,
other road users) interpret the actions of AVs and vice versa? How might
humans behave towards vehicles without a human driver? Technology-
oriented HMI research does not account for questions about how AVs will
be adopted and appropriated by people in their everyday lives, or more
broadly how people's relationships with AV technologies might emerge
and develop over time. This is one areawherewe think that social scientific
approaches can provide valuable insights.
This task starts with a conundrum, however. According to classic atti-
tude theories, attitudes may be inferred from the evaluative responses peo-
ple express towards a defined attitude object, in the form of opinions,
behaviour or other reactions (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). But, asked about
their attitudes towards AVs, different people will imagine different things
by “AVs”. People's future reactions to emerging technologies are therefore
impossible to map definitively. Some may take this as an argument for
disregarding public opinion altogether, but we would disagree. Moscovici's
Social Representations Theory (SRT) proposes that people make sense of3new information by anchoring it within pre-existing concepts, turning the
unfamiliar into the familiar (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999). Abelson's (1981)
Script Theory proposes that we organise our behavioural routines into ex-
pected scripts, so that new possibilities are integrated into existing patterns
of behaviour. These theories offer some scaffolding for researching new
technologies and, by presenting a range of possible futures to people, we
can gain a richer understanding of the factors or principles that underlie
their attitudes. Methodologically, we need to keep at the front of our
minds that the way in which we frame or present new technologies to re-
search participants is crucially important for how they react, and we need
to do this reflexively.
Tennant et al. (2019) provide a simple overview of the framings
employed in general public surveys of AVs. In the literature to date, we typ-
ically find majorities of respondents expressing discomfort at the variously
framed prospects of AVs (e.g. European Commission, Directorate-General
for the Information Society and Media and TNS Opinion & Social, 2015;
European Commission, Directorate General for Communications Networks
and TNS Opinion & Social, 2017; AAA NewsRoom, 2019), although in
Asian markets survey respondents have tended to view the technology
more favourably (Schoettle and Sivak, 2014). Surveys have elicited con-
cerns over issues such as safety, cybersecurity, and anticipated cost, as
well as doubting the usefulness of the technology (Cavoli et al., 2017).
They also find enthusiasm for possible benefits, such as reduced congestion
or time freed up by not driving, in some cases exploring the relationship be-
tween the two (e.g. Wadud, 2017).
Although a range of framings can be seen in this research, there is a no-
table tendency to situate the topic within the routines of private-car pur-
chase and driving (e.g. Kyriakidis et al., 2015), and to focus on testing
and explaining people's willingness to use and willingness to pay for self-
driving technology, casting the role of the public narrowly as potential
users or consumers of the technology. The Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM) has often been deployed in this literature in an attempt to under-
stand how to encourage people to ‘accept’ AVs and persuade them the tech-
nology is safe (e.g. Hutchins and Hook, 2017). The TAM usually focuses on
perceived usefulness and ease of use of the technology as predictors of up-
take. But the long history of attitude research in social psychology tells us
that expressed opinions are often not consistent with behaviour. Myriad
factors are at play in explaining people's behaviours, as well as their
moment-specific attitudes, and context is key.
Understanding the heterogeneity of contexts in particular is crucial. The
focus on whether people are willing to get in to and use AVs neglects the
views of people sharing the physical space intowhich newmobility systems
would be introduced. For most people, first encounters with AVs will be as
drivers, cyclists or pedestrians required to interact with them. The TAM has
historically been used to explain how new technologies succeed or fail as
they are used by employees in organisational settings. This provides a nat-
urally bounded and relatively homogeneous context, quite different to the
diverse contexts that constitute public responses to a newmobility technol-
ogy, or even system.
Transport researchers have long sought to understand themultiple roles
that people enact in relation to the transport system, often employing seg-
mentation analyses to differentiate people into distinct (potential) clusters
(Rode et al., 2015; Bansal et al., 2016; Anable, 2005). They recognise that
public opinion should not be treated as homogeneous, nor as a binary
work/leisure transport, willing/unwilling to use/buy etc., but rather that
multiple attitudes and behaviours towards AVswill emerge amongmultiple
social contexts and, often, within individuals.
Hildebrand and Sheller (2018) offer an early study of the cultural con-
text of AVs, following historical associations between automobility, gender
and sexuality (Mellström, 2004). Their study of media promotions for
Nissan's and Volvo's AVs shows a recalibration of masculinity. AVs, most
likely powered by quiet electric engines, reduce the driver's control of the
vehicle,mainly relegating him to the passive role of passenger and challeng-
ing tropes of mastery, noise, power, masculinity and heterosexuality that
have been selling points for cars. We note that the retention of a ‘driver’
role differentiates the approaches taken by technology firms versus vehicle
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market.
In the course of mapping diverse attitudes andmultiple groupings in re-
lation to AVs, we need to ensure that we range widely enough in the ques-
tions we ask research participants. AVs may have profound and far-
reaching impacts, and we should be asking research participants for their
reactions to major as well as minor alterations to daily life. For example,
how do they feel about possible changes to land use and social norms that
may result from AVs? How do they feel about shifts in responsibility for
decision-making on the road, from human drivers to AI systems? How do
people whose jobs involve driving, or running existing transport systems,
feel about a technology that could lead to a restructuring of employment?
What do people think of the possible wider health and economic impacts
of the development of this technology?
We argue that it is necessary in modern democracies to engage with the
public over these kinds of issues, as the technology is being developed. The
relationship between, for example, biotechnologies and diverse publics
(Gaskell et al., 2000) suggests that, however difficult they are to research,
today's attitudes towards tomorrow's technologies need to be heeded. Pub-
lic (and interest group) reactions may be surprising, antagonistic or mis-
chievous as people engage with the technological novelty and guess at its
social constitution.Withmany technologies, including geneticallymodified
crops, nanotechnology and synthetic biology, promotors have failed to re-
spect public opinion, and treated it simply as a challenge of educating the
public into acceptance. This stance, exemplified in what some call the “def-
icit model” (e.g. Welsh and Wynne, 2013), has limited explanatory power
because it imagines the public in narrow terms, and has also been criticised
on normative grounds (Wynne, 2006).
AVs are being tested in some places on public roads, which means that
somemembers of the public are already encountering a version of the tech-
nology. Here, prototype testing in social environments is framed as an op-
portunity for public engagement with innovation – as for example with
the Gateway testing of pods in Greenwich park, London (McDowell-
Naylor, 2018), or UK Autodrive testing in Milton Keynes and Coventry
(UK Autodrive, 2019). The introduction of AVs into society entails a poten-
tial change in the very ways in which publics first encounter new technol-
ogy, through experimentation in society rather than through public
consultations on new regulatory frameworks (Lezaun et al., 2017; Marres,
2018).
Social-scientific research into attitudes towards AVs should not present
‘the public’ as an entity of one mind, nor be equated with market research
designed to achieve AV adoption. There is considerable existing scholarship
in researching the public's relation to other new technologies from which
lessons can be learnt, and theoretical frameworks borrowed. Social scien-
tists can offer ways of systematically exploring the multifarious nature of
people's responses to actual and imagined AVs, and track their evolution
over time. Social scientists can also offer models for public engagement
that go beyond top-down education projects (e.g. Wilsdon and Willis,
2004).
2.3. Distributional impacts
Claims for technologies are often presented in terms of aggregate bene-
fits, balanced against aggregate risks, with strong incentives to accentuate
the positive. Promotors of AVs are no less utilitarian in their discourse.
However, the promised gains of new technologies rarely match the actual
pattern of eventual benefits. In blunt terms, we can expect there to be win-
ners and losers, and we may not predict accurately how these play out.
Notwithstanding the multiple possible AV worlds discussed above, we
can expect the hardware of AVs to be expensive, at least to begin with and
perhaps for a long time. And we can reasonably expect that the use of AVs
would not be universally affordable, even following bullish scenarios of the
potential cost-savings from removing taxi drivers. Public attitudes to AVs
will likely be differentiated by social groups and conditioned by perceptions
of the uneven benefits and risks of the technology. Groups who stand to ben-
efit most, including poor or disabled people, may be marginalised by the4implementation of the technology, and – a warning for us – made invisible
by social research conducted without sufficient thought about the multiple
user and non-user groups. We need to ask who might “lose” or even be
harmed by the introduction of the technology. There is a risk that the existing
injustice caused by unequal access to conventional private cars (Lucas, 2012)
may be exacerbated, for example. How might existing inequalities be
reproduced, entrenched, or changed, with the introduction of AVs?Of course
this hinges crucially on what form AVs take – so is strongly linked to the
theme of ‘AV worlds’. These inequalities might be usefully separated into
two domains: technical design, and social-structural.
At the level of technical design, we should ask, for the various future
scenarios, who would be able to use the new technology applications,
who would be physically excluded, and who might be placed in a position
of more physical risk. There is a significant gap between saying that the
technology will assist those whose accessibility may be limited because of
personal circumstances, and creating interfaces that are truly inclusive.
Thought must be given to whether systems will be accessible to someone
who may be blind, may not own a smart phone or hold a bank account.
In terms of safety, we need to scrutinise how AVs make decisions in near-
accident situations, and whether their dominance would eventually push
certain other users off the roads.
At the level of social and societal structures, we need to ask, for the var-
ious future scenarios, who would have the opportunity and the means to
use the new technology, and whowould be economically or geographically
excluded. AV developers will have incentives to follow likely consumers,
whichmeans wealthy professionals who are likely to already havemobility
options. We need to ask what this means for those who are unable to afford
to buy or rent such a vehicle and how this maps onto those with mobility
needs. And the technology will be limited by geography, certainly in its
early days. Many AVs systems may be ‘geofenced’ to particular cities
(Fagnant and Kockelman, 2018) or constrained for use on particular road
types. Most development attention currently seems focused on urban cen-
tres. Those who would rely on shared AV systems (where journeys are
made in vehicles not exclusively ownedby the user) mayfind that availabil-
ity differs greatly between urban and rural areas, and between rich and
poor areas. Even if AVs in principle can bring access to groups that have
hitherto lost out, the practice may be very different. There is a clear role
for government policy in helping to even out access to the technology. How-
ever, this might come at a substantial cost if infrastructure in rural areas,
where people typically have less access to other modes of transport, needs
to be upgraded to enable the vehicles' operation.
There is substantial interest in the question of when AVs will arrive as a
workable technology. As social scientists, we would say the more pertinent
questions are where, for whom and in what form might the technology ar-
rive (Cohen and Cavoli, 2016, 2019; Cavoli et al., 2017)? And where, for
whom and in what form(s) should it arrive? Social science can help focus
policy attention on what society might want from the technology and out-
line how the technology might or might not help, feeding actively into pol-
icy decisions about how it is developed.
2.4. Safety
Promoters of AVs often make the safety case for them central to their
communications: human error is responsible for the vast majority of
motor accidents, and so the argument is made that removing people from
the steering wheel will logically result in a vastly reduced number of acci-
dents. However, the complexity of current road driving is an enormous
challenge for AI. How to teach AVs to manage the road is a technical chal-
lenge, but it needs to be accompanied by social science input on two impor-
tant questions: what defines acceptable levels of safety? And how will
safety standards be developed and regulated, at both national and interna-
tional levels?
Users of public transport expect a higher level of safety than they toler-
ate in their own driving – it has long been known that with a train or air-
craft, passengers' levels of acceptable risk tend to be orders of magnitude
lower (Starr, 1969). A majority of drivers believe that their driving skills
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(and convenience) offered by driving offer some explanation of people's
willingness to engage in this statistically riskier form of transport. So we
need to understand citizens' perceptions of acceptable levels of risk from
AVs: do the public expect AVs to be significantly safer than human drivers?
How safe is ‘safe enough’? (Fischhoff et al., 1978).
Some (e.g. Kalra and Groves, 2017; Sparrow and Howard, 2017) have
argued that automated vehicles should be introduced very quickly, once
it can be assured that they perform slightly better than average human
drivers. But it is simplistic to compare new technologies against older
ones on the basis of aggregate performance – and not trivial to decide ex-
actly how to measure aggregate performance. The current hazards of driv-
ing are highly socially and geographically differentiated. Newer vehicles
and, in particular, those with 5-star safety performance, are far safer than
old ones (Lie and Tingvall, 2002; Kullgren et al., 2010) but cost more,
with the consequence that their benefits are enjoyed by wealthier drivers.
Road conditions and terrain, and driving culture, are also key determinants
of safety statistics such as accident rates.
It follows that there may be segmentation in expectations of safety: for
example there may be early adopters who would welcome AVs even with
the qualification that there might be some risk in using them. Social-
science studies of technological risk find that the question ‘how safe is
safe enough?’ is tied to the imagined purposes and beneficiaries of the tech-
nology. The question becomes ‘safe enough for what?’ (c.f. Liu et al., 2019)
and, we would add, ‘safe enough for whom?’
It is crucially important to pose and discuss these questions, as the his-
tory of car use teaches us. In the USA, for example, for many years it was
felt that a high level of death on the roads was a reasonable price to pay
for enjoying the benefits of the car, and that it fell to industry and not gov-
ernment to address the problem (Norman, 1962; Vinsel, 2018). From the
introduction of motor vehicles in the USA it took some 70 years, and the
persistent action of people such as Ralph Nader (Center for Autosafety, n.
d.), until there was concerted regulation of the safety performance of
those vehicles.
Nowadays there are several regulatory models for safety at the national
and international levels. There is also no shortage of new technologies
that will save lives even in non-automated vehicles, as revealed by the
evidence base for proposed revisions to the European General Safety
Regulation on the minimum safety equipment for new vehicles (Hunt
et al., 2017). Simple technologies to force compliance with existing
speed limits alone would make driving substantially safer (Lai et al.,
2012). But these technologies are not, for the most part, being promoted
by vehicle manufacturers.
On this evidence, then, we should not rely on industry self-regulation
for safety standards in AVs. This is not a controversial stance in, for exam-
ple, the UK, where the Law Commission (commissioned by the UK
government's Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles) has been ac-
tive in consulting for and developing proposals for regulation of AVs (Law
Commission, 2018). The process of setting and assessing standards will be
socially (as well as technically) complex, including verification of the auto-
mated driving system's performance in what have been hitherto human
functions— understanding of both formal and informal rules, perception
and reaction, gap detection and manoeuvring, and adaptation to changing
road and traffic conditions. A slow response to fatal crashes by US regula-
tors (National Transportation Safety Board, 2019; Shepardson, 2019) sug-
gests that other countries may need to lead the international debate.
2.5. Physical infrastructures
Despite the narrative of autonomy, in which the promise is that AVs
“change the world without changing the world” (Stilgoe, 2019), if the tech-
nology is to become commonplace, it will demand, to a greater or lesser de-
gree depending of the form it takes, changes to physical infrastructures –
such as transport systems, town and city planning, and architecture.
Changes to infrastructure and the built environment have profound social,
political and environmental implications (Tierney, 2017). Urban space in5particular is highly contested. Different groups want different things from
cities and their transport systems, and not all voices are heard equally.
Changes to cities are path dependent: established cities represent the accre-
tion of centuries of development and redevelopment as societies have
evolved their technologies – especially those for mobility – and economies.
Even though the future deployment of the technology is not yet clear,
we are already seeing proposals for design and redesign (e.g. Noyman
et al., 2017; Guerra, 2016). Advocates for AVs suggest that the technology
would have myriad planning benefits, but would not at first require any
changes to infrastructure. Bilger (2013) quotes Sergey Brin, president of Al-
phabet: “Afleet of vehicles could operate as a personalised public- transpor-
tation system… streets would clear, highways shrink, parking lots turn to
parkland.” While developed cities will have slow, messy transitions to
new technologies, developing cities may be designed around a particular
AV technology, just as cities were planned around the car in the Twentieth
Century.
But there will doubtless be unintended planning consequences of wide-
spread adoption of privately owned AVs, MaaS, or both (Pangbourne et al.,
2018). These could include large peri-urban vehicle depots to replace urban
parking (Alessandrini et al., 2015; Heinrichs, 2016) and increased sprawl as
reduced journey costs and freedom of movement encourage longer trips
(Papa and Ferreira, 2018). As places are upgraded, regenerated or
reimagined as ‘smart cities’, things that were accepted as facts of life are
opened up for renegotiation. AVs are a seductive part of these visions
(Calvillo et al., 2016), because they promise to turn the independent, un-
predictable driver into something more legible.
Social scientists should play a role in understanding the impacts and in-
equalities of proposed changes to already unequal infrastructures and ad-
vising on alternative trajectories and their governance. We should not
wait for an AV-related infrastructural disaster (Graham, 2010) before
recognising the significance of the architecture and infrastructure on
which the new technology depends.
2.6. Data
Though less visible, an equally profound andmore rapid part of AV tran-
sitions will be developments in digital systems. The systems inside AVs and
the connections they make with each other, other road users and other in-
frastructures (particularly in urban settings) will all be data-driven. The
safe and efficient running of AVs will require communication between ve-
hicles and data/information systems (Agrawal et al., 2018). The digital con-
nectedness of vehicles has already been growing for the last few years, and
the possibilities of automation suggest an increase and intensification of
this data-gathering.
On a simple level digital systems are part of the theme of infrastructure,
and key issues relate to capacity and designing systems that function ade-
quately, and for social science about the nature of work in those systems.
But the infrastructure and the content it collects have profound implications
for privacy, security and freedom, and social science can play a role here,
particularly in explicating and advocating for citizens' rights. Emerging
social-science research into the politics of data and algorithms will be an
important part of understanding and scrutinising possible AV systems.
Questions of data bias, data ownership, data use and data sharing are likely
to become even more politically important in the context of AV worlds,
alongside those of accountability of machine learning systems in, for exam-
ple, crash investigations (Winfield and Jirotka, 2018; Stilgoe, 2018). The
questions surrounding data pertain not just to the safety and security of
AV systems, but also to the distributional impacts in terms of who benefits
and how.
Both digital and physical infrastructures, and the rules that emerge
around them, can be understood as a form of “solidified politics”: they
are the accreted products of political contestation over time, that contesta-
tion being a multi-way process between diverse actors. When studied
alongside cultures and patterns of social behaviour, we see that these sys-
tems are not just things to be “disrupted” by innovation, but can equally
be understood as factors that may constrain attempts to deploy new
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questions redolent of many aspects of social science, including political the-
ory, philosophy, ethics, law, social psychology and social anthropology. As
with the theme of safety, leaving data systems regulation to accident or in-
dustry would be deeply irresponsible. The challenges and issues implied
under the heading of ‘data’ will be viewed very differently in different po-
litical ideologies, by commercial organisations, governments and interna-
tional organisations, and among citizens. Social scientists can help to
theorise and operationalize the questions of what different data systems
imply for people's security and privacy, what gains and losses they incur,
and for whom.2.7. The environment
The potential environmental benefits of AVs have been widely
discussed and cited as motivations for their development. The move away
from fossil fuels is not inherently tied to AVs alone, but most representa-
tions of AV development appear to assume the use of electricity (which
will presumably be sustainably sourced). The potential energy savings
from getting vehicles off the road is also often referenced in discussions of
MaaS deployments of AVs. Carbon emissions of AVs will be a function of
travel activity, the energy intensity of travel and the carbon intensity of
the energy source. Early studies on impacts of vehicle automation have fo-
cused on energy or carbon intensity only. There are several mechanisms
that could improve fuel efficiency of individual automated vehicles, includ-
ing improved traffic flow through improved connectivity, platooning to re-
duce drag and lighter-weight vehicles if crash risks are demonstrably lower
(Wadud et al., 2016).
However, AVs could also increase car use through widening access, in-
creasing convenience and encouraging empty running, thus resulting in net
environmental damage. Much research has suggested that AVs are likely to
boost travel demand and energy demand (Wadud et al., 2016; Auld et al.,
2018; Taiebat et al., 2018).
It seems, therefore, that governance is needed to ensure that any possi-
ble environmental benefits of AV are harnessed.While there is a strong syn-
ergy between electrification and automation of vehicles (e.g. higher
utilisation of automatedmobility services vehicles will likely produce a bet-
ter economic return for electric traction than internal combustion), it ap-
pears the development of electrification would still likely be governed by
policies and air quality concerns, rather than automation. The future will
be determined more by the attitudes and decisions of users, citizens and
policymakers than by any inherent characteristics of the technology. Even
though developers of AV hardware and, in particular, software, claim that
the technology is ‘just around the corner’, much of what needs to happen
to enable a functioning, low-carbon transport system and a fair transition
to such a system lies well beyond the control of technology developers
alone.
Indeed, managing the transition is just as much a challenge as agreeing
on an aimed-for future mobility scenario. In terms of both possible future
AV worlds, and possible future journeys towards those AV worlds, there
has already been a deal of varying speculation. The slow pace at which
the vehicle fleet evolves must not be ignored: for many years and perhaps
decades after the first putative fully automated, electric vehicle is offered
for sale, the bulk of vehicles will be manually driven and powered by fossil
fuel. And the likelihood of a dramatic switch from ownership to mobility
services is uncertain. Arbib and Seba (2017) suggest every urban household
would give up vehicle ownership, while Wadud (2017) is more conserva-
tive about such changes. Some have considered the likelihood or desirabil-
ity of prohibition of private ownership of AVs in dense urban areas on
sustainability grounds (Thomopoulos and Givoni, 2015), the assumption
being that all AV use would instead happen through shared-use platforms.
Each scenario could have substantial implications for environmental im-
pact. As such, understanding the evolution of exclusive-use and shared-
use mobility services is key to understanding the energy and carbon effects
of automated vehicles.62.8. Governance and power
Governance is the steering of social, political and technological
change. It involves complex and polycentric power relationships, in
which the authority to influence mobility is dispersed across different
types of actors, scales, and institutions (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998;
Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Theories of governance recognise the state
as one player in decision-making and implementation processes. The
rules for the function of mobility systems are determined by the state,
non-governmental agencies, private sector and third-sector organisa-
tions interacting with one another. These actors' influence may be deter-
mined constitutionally (they have a specific role determined in law, for
example), financially (through their ability to levy taxes or access pri-
vate equity for example), or through their collection of, or access to, in-
formation and data (Rhodes, 1996).
Therefore, understanding the current governance system surrounding
automobility, how it is changing and how it should be altered with the ad-
vent of AVs, is essential for realising the potential benefits of AVs, and mit-
igating their risks (Marsden and Reardon, 2018; Cohen and Cavoli, 2019).
A transition to AVs could challenge the status quo in many ways, shifting
power to different actors within the governance system. For example, suc-
cessful integration of the technology for AVs requires interoperability, the
rules and standards for which may need to be decided at the supra-
national level, which may reduce the autonomy or influence of sub-
national actors, such as local authorities, in determining the nature of
road infrastructure and how it is used and managed. The locus (or loci) of
power within the governance system will therefore be crucial in determin-
ing the nature of how AVs will operate, and the ability to effect change in
the system once implemented.
Economics and political economy provide tools for understanding the im-
plications of the state-market-society nexus for the emergence and gover-
nance of AVs. The role of data in the running of self-driving systems will
make AV markets more susceptible than others to monopolistic competition.
There are likely to be substantial economic returns to scale in AV systems,
given a dependence on data and machine learning, and the efficiencies that
are likely to come from running fleets as opposed to individual vehicles.
Data hoarding could impede the possible safety benefits of AVs (Krompier,
2017).
Any scrutiny of power in a (developing) AV world needs to include an
appreciation of the role of ideas in shaping political economies and eventu-
ally determining policy pathways (Rodrik, 2014). As in other new areas of
transport (such as car clubs which, as part of the sharing economy, led to a
reshaping of the relationship between the market and the state), the way in
which consumers of an emerging technology are imagined by private- and
public-sector stakeholders will influence what is offered to them and in
what form (Akyelken et al., 2018; Bergman et al., 2017). This returns us
to the theme of the “public”, discussed earlier. With a particular concern re-
garding power dynamics, as social scientists we need to highlight (hidden)
inequalities or absent voices – for example, that seat belt systems are de-
signed formale drivers; that opinions are disproportionately sought and ob-
tained fromwealthy white males who already enjoy high access tomobility
(Wigley and Rose, 2020).
Researching the nature, dynamics and evolution of governance specifi-
cally and power more broadly is not rightly the remit of parties who have
interests in the system, be they manufacturers or regulators. And yet it is
crucial to protect those citizens onwhompower and governance is enacted,
who live the consequences of those processes and structures.
3. Conclusions
We have used the themes above to illustrate our central arguments. We
started from the uncontroversial premise that the development and emer-
gence of AVs are likely to lead to profound and wide-ranging shifts in our
world, with implications for economic structures, land use, lifestyles and
personal well-being. We argue that these areas of impact have been given
at best cursory thought to date, as attention has been concentrated on a
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tem itself. We contend that the narrowness of focus is in large part due to a
preoccupation with the technological issues relating to AVs and a tendency
to give less weight to the social issues. If technological issues continue to
dominate the research effort, questions of huge societal importance will
be either missed or dealt with superficially.
Social scientists are already active on AV topics and, in saying this, it is
important to emphasise the diversity of social science as a group of disci-
plines. As noted earlier, some psychologists, for example, are relatively
well embedded in the testing of AV technology, but much of their activity
is focused on narrow questions of human-machine interaction. Our conten-
tion is that social science canmake amore effective and constructive contri-
bution if the full range of social-science disciplines is brought inside the
wider AV research community. We have warned against the risks of post-
poning social research or defining questions narrowly. The best way of
minimising these risks is by social science being involved early and in an
ongoing, constructive way.
We have identified that social scientists can bring clarity to complex
questions relating to AVs, using a wide range of organising principles,
tools and approaches. We have identified particular opportunities in re-
spect of exploring the range of possible futures, distributional impacts of
the technology and the role, use and impact of data. On the specific ques-
tion of introducing public opinion more successfully into the technology's
development and governance, we have robust methods that will both
cater to the diversity of opinion and enable members of the public to partic-
ipate meaningfully in the process.
We do not ignore the challenges that this would bring. All cross-
disciplinary activity requires participants to appreciate distinct approaches
to questions, hypotheses, arguments and evidence. Disciplinary cultures en-
compass epistemology as well as empirical practice. Successful cross-
disciplinary collaboration therefore relies on a degree of mutual under-
standing and respect. The effort required for such collaboration is surely
justified by the importance of the subject matter.
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